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THE FORGOTTEN REAPPRAISAL:
BRITISH GRAND STRATEGY IN THE WAKE OF SUEZ

The Suez crisis of 1956 was perhaps Britain's most severe diplomatic humiliation of
the twentieth century. It is commonly viewed as a watershed in twentieth century British
history, when the country took a decisive step away from world power. However, as with
many crises said to usher in a new era, the reverberations of Suez were thought to be felt
only with the passing of time.

Despite the tremendous shock which the Suez affair

represented, the post-World War II consensus around the welfare state at home and continued
great power status abroad held firm in the late 1950s.
It is commonly assumed that as long as this consensus remained unchallenged, larger
questions about Britain's future role in the world could not be put forward. Consensus set
definite parameters around policy, and since these parameters were accepted as a given, a farreaching reevaluation of Britain's overseas interests was improbable. "It might have been
expected," as David Sanders asserts, "that Britain's most serious diplomatic humiliation in
modern times would have occasioned . . . a thorough-going formal reconsideration of
Britain's world role. Yet, no such review takes place. "1 In this regard, it was difficult for
British policymakers, much less the British public, to view the Suez crisis as a manifestation
of Britain's broader decline in the world, and perhaps even a permanent blow to the country's
great power status. They preferred to believe, as Harold Macmillan told his conservative
colleagues while vying for the party's leadership in the wake of Suez, that the diplomatic
humiliation in the Sinai desert was only a tactical defeat, which like "the retreats from Mons
and Dunkirk ... should prove the prelude to a strategic victory. "2

1

In general, then, despite the initial trauma of the Suez crisis, "the British ship of state
sailed on" in the late 1950s, as Bernard Porter has observed, "unaltered and unadapted. "3
The imperial illusion, as some would later call it, remained tightly intertwined with the fabric
of British politics in the late 1950s. Upon taking office in January 1957, Harold Macmillan
appeared to unblinkingly guide Britain back to a position of international prominence, all the
while clinging to the multiple symbols of Britain's great power status: sterling's position as
a reserve currency, nuclear weapons, ,and an extensive overseas military presence. 4
Although it is correct in its broad outline, this standard image of the post-Suez period
is flawed in the details. These details are enlightening, for they cast considerable light on
Britain's gradual adjustment to a less prominent international role in the post-1945 era.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, a series of sweeping reviews of Britain's role in the world
were commissioned in the wake of the Suez affair, and one of the most well-entrenched and
potent symbols of Britain's great power status was earnestly questioned:

the country's

overseas military network. With these reviews, the wall of certainty which had for so long
surrounded the country's world role began to show its first cracks. And, when a deeplyrooted policy paradigm which has guided a nation's· policy course for decades and even
centuries begins to crumble, it is crucial that the first fissures be both uncovered and
emphasized.
Interestingly, despite the fact that these reviews were the first major attempt to
reevaluate Britain's world role since the Second World War, this reevaluation process has
•'

..

'

scarcely been documented, much less stressed, in the literature on British foreign policy. 5
This may be partly explained by the tight secrecy which surrounded the enterprise.
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Knowledge of this rethink of British global strategy was not only kept from the country's
closest allies, including the United States, it was also withheld from the full Cabinet. 6 In the
pages that follow, a more exhaustive account of the secret reviews of Britain's world role
which followed Suez is presented.
Yet, more than simply shedding new light on an important episode in post-1945 British
history, this study also goes far in shattering a more general myth on Britain's post-1945
adaptation to international decline. Although British policymakers surely did benefit from a
smooth-running foreign policy machine at the bureaucratic level in the post 1945 period, the
common image of cool and level-headed foreign-policy mandarins accurately gauging the
extent of Britain's international decline and then easing their political chiefs into timely and
sensible foreign policy adjustments is misleading. Despite the fact that they were often a
portrait of consistency and uniformity, the "managers of orderly decline" within the foreign
policy bureaucracy, as aptly described by Sir William Armstrong, former permanent secretary
to the Treasury, were not of one voice when considering the future shape of Britain's broader
role in the world. 7 In contrast to the prevailing image, Whitehall did not move in lock-step
fashion toward the placid waters of continuity and consensus in the late 1950s.
Before analyzing the series of secret reviews of Britain's world role which followed
the Suez crisis, it is first necessary to describe the paradigm which in large part guided
British foreign policy in the first decades following the Second World War. After this, the
reasons why the defense reviews prior to the Suez debacle did not consider, much less scathe,
this paradigm, while the secret reviews initiated after 1956 placed it under direct scrutiny,
must be outlined. Finally, turning to the secret reviews themselves demonstrates that the
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standard image of a relatively smooth return to the politics of consensus and world power
after the Suez debacle requires amendment.

The Paradigm of "World Role" and the Overseas Military Network:
Sacrosanct Prior to the Secret Reviews

In the period after 1945, if not long before, one predominant policy paradigm helped
to guide British foreign policymakers--the paradigm of "world role. "8

A policy paradigm

is an unquestioned assumption which frames decision-makers' perceptions and sets parameters
around their policy calculations. 9 In this regard, British policymakers in the 1950s had been
weaned on world power, and politicians and the public alike could envision no role for the
country other than that of a great power, with its influence felt across the globe. Since the
paradigm of world role was the initial lens through which most, if not all, British leaders
viewed the international environment at this time, and which allowed them to make sense of
the world around them, it was itself rarely questioned. In 1954, Sir Oliver Franks, the
British Ambassador to Washington from 1948 to 1952, provided what is perhaps the best
characterization of this paradigm:
. . . we assume that our future will be of one piece with our past and that we
shall continue as a Great Power. What is noteworthy is the way that we take this
for granted. It is not a belief arrived at after reflection by a conscious decision.
It is part of the habit and furniture of our minds: a principle so much one with
our outlook and character that it determines the way we act without emerging
itself into clear .consciousness. 10
Although it is rarely acknowledged, the first serious challenge to this habit of mind within
the government followed on the heels of the Suez crisis, and it is this challenge which is the
focus of this study.

4

Yet, Britain's world role was, and perhaps still is, a multifarious entity. Its three
fundamental planks in the post-1945 period were sterling's status as a reserve currency, the
nuclear deterrent, and the country's extensive overseas military role. The British were also
dealt an unusually rich hand in other areas important to the "Great Game" of international
diplomacy, such as seasoned diplomats, a first-rate intelligence apparatus, and a moral
authority in the world which perhaps exceeded the country's true material power. As might
be expected, British policymakers{ perceptions of which of these different ingredients of
international power were most vital to the country's world role varied over time.
Only one of these ingredients was called into serious question in the secret reviews
following the Suez affair. It was, however, the longest-standing and perhaps the most deeply
ingrained plank of Britain's world role at this time, the country's military role in the Middle
East and South and Southeast Asia. Commonly called the east of Suez network, the heart of
this role consisted of a great chain of bases stretching east from the Suez Canal (and later
Aden) through the Indian Ocean and on to Singapore and;Hong Kong in the Far East. 11 To
many Britons in the first decade following the Second World War, both in the public and in
the foreign policy establishment, it seemed that an inexorable link existed between Britain's
overseas military network and the country's wealth, its security, and ultimately, its
greatness. 12 The country's rise to world power in prior centuries had, after all, been built
on the mutually beneficial relationship between industry and overseas trade on the one hand
and a strategic chain of bases on the other. 13 Although it was recognized after the Suez
crisis that pressures such as Third World nationalism and chiding world opinion were placing
British bases in an increasingly precarious position, it was still widely felt that Britain's
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military presence in the Middle East and Asia was part of the natural state of world affairs,
and would remain so indefinitely.
At first glance, the fact that Britain's military role abroad was subject to a sweeping
re-examination after the Suez affair may not seem a novel observation, despite the fact that
the imperial illusion is widely accepted to have lingered on in the late 1950s. The country's
overseas military network had come under criticism as early as 1952, when R.A. Butler, the
Chancellor, argued that the "whole field of our overseas commitments" must be reviewed and
brought into closer relation with Britain's economic capacity to fulfill them. 14 Anthony
Eden, the Foreign Minister, agreed, conceding that overseas commitments, particularly
military commitments, were "placing a burden on the country's economy which is beyond the
resources of the country to meet. "15 Yet, significantly, although defense economies became
a consistent concern of Conservative Cabinets, a fundamental reappraisal of the country's
world role never occurred in the early 1950s. From year to year, small savings were found
in defense, but the underlying paradigm of world role, buttressed as it was by an extensive
overseas military presence, was never seriously questioned.
By far the most far-reaching of these pre-Suez reappraisals, the Policy Review
Committee established in June 1956 by then Prime Minister Anthony Eden, offers the best
illustration of this point. Comprised of ministers from overseas departments, the committee
was to reconsider the entirety of Britain's global strategy given recent transformations in the
international environment, particularly the advent of thermo-nuclear technology and Britain's
.
.
diminishing economic clout.

Eden was keenly aware that the country's global military

posture was becoming an undue strain on its economy. He neatly summarized the impetus
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for the review, which was the need to reduce overseas commitments, when he declared: "We
must now cut our coat according to our cloth. There is not much cloth. "16
Nevertheless, this presumably exhaustive review took as its starting point two central
foreign policy objectives:

to avoid a global war and to protect Britain's vital overseas

interests, particularly access to oil. 17 By framing the inquiry in this way, Eden ensured that
the chief military components of Britain's world role, the nuclear deterrent and an overseas
military network, would remain above reproach.

Britain's greatest contribution to the

prevention of global war was, after all, widely thought to be the possession of an atomic
arsenal, while maintaining a string of military bases abroad was the surest way to safeguard
the flow of oil and other vital resources to the British Isles.
Although Eden's Policy Review Committee was eventually overtaken by the events
of winter 1956, the scrutiny of Britain's overseas military network only intensified in the
wake of the Suez affair.

The infamous 1957 Defense White Paper was a public

pronouncement that the country's overseas military presence would be streamlined because
of its straightened economic circumstances. Commonly known as the Sandys Doctrine, the
1957 White Paper consummated the evolution of strategic thought in Britain since the Korean
War by anchoring the country's military presence abroad on nuclear weapons, thus allowing
smaller, more mobile conventional force structures than in the past.
Yet, the Sandys reforms did not alter the broad conception of Britain's role in the
world, particularly its military role. Even after the substantial defense cuts of 1957, military
commitments and large numbers of troops and bases would remain scattered across the globe.
Less than a year after the announcement of the 1957 White Paper, the Defense Minister
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himself, Duncan Sandys, underscored this point, stating that the country's increased reliance
on atomic weapons "does not obviate the need for maintaining a substantial shield of land
forces, with air and naval support, to defend the frontiers of the free world. "18

As it had

during Eden's review of global strategy, the underlying paradigm of British foreign policy,
a world role undergirded by an extensive overseas military presence, remained inviolate.

The Secret Reviews of Britain's World Role

In contrast, the secret reviews initiated shortly after the Sandys reforms cut deeper.
Instead of merely searching for ways to maintain the country's overseas military presence on
the cheap, these reviews scrutinized the central, underlying assumptions of British foreign
policy. ·The entire apparatus of Britain's overseas policy was critically reexamined, including
the long-ingrained notion that Britain must, inevitably,. maintain a world role, with a
respectable military presence overseas. Even if it was a surreptitious process, concealed from
the wider world and even the full Cabinet, the fact that the country's broader world role was
now on the policy agenda, open for scrutiny, was a significant event. It· marked a notable,
perhaps even critical, step in Britain's long progression away from global power in the
twentieth century.
Concerns similar to earlier defense reviews prompted the secret reviews, namely
Britain's deteriorating economic situation and the mounting costs of the country's defense
apparatus.

Apprehension over Britain's weakening international position was, of course,
\

..

..~ -

heightened after the humiliation of the Suez operation. A fairly potent mood of neutralism
swept the country in early 1957, with major newspapers such The Economist, the Financial
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Times, The Times, and the Observer beginning to question the benefits Britain derived from
an extensive overseas military role. 19 A prominent Royal Institute of International Affairs
study of the time on British Interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East argued that
Britain should rely less on force and more on commercial, technical, and cultural influences
to promote her interests east of the Suez. 20 Slightly later Sir Basil Liddell-Hart, Britain's
foremost military strategist, went even further by asserting that Britain should concentrate
solely on a regional military role in Europe, since Britain's military bases abroad had become
little more than "crumbling sand castles" in the face of rising Arab and African
nationalism. 21
To many in the articulate public, the Suez episode seemed to underscore the fact that,
in the world--of the 1950s, international influence could not be gained through the use of
force.

And worse still, even if it could, the Suez affair demonstrated that Britain was

- incapable of brandishing its military sword independently of the superpowers, particularly the
United States. Given these apparently stark facts of the post-Suez world order, many in the
press and the Parliament began to call for a fundamental reexamination of Britain's foreign
policy. Despite his repeated, almost habitual, declarations of Britain's greatness, Harold
Macmillan agreed with these critics and it seems that key officials did as well. 22 The basis
of Britain's overseas policy did require reevaluation. But no matter how much they seemed
to correspond with the domestic mood, the existence of committees set up to reappraise
Britain's world role could not be made public. News that the British were contemplating
potentially dramatic changes in their overseas presence would have caused concern among
allied governments. British statesmen had also long understood the importance of intangibles
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in world affairs. It was, as they undoubtedly recognized, likely that Britain's international
prestige would be damaged if the existence of these secret reviews became known to the
wider world.
There was one further reason the secret reviews were initiated. They were an attempt
to overcome the fragmentation and biases inherent in Britain's foreign policy apparatus which
up to this point had made a comprehensive, objective reevaluation of Britain's foreign and
defense policy impossible. A plethora of rival departments had long characterized Britain's
foreign policy machinery.

The few overarching institutions which existed, such as the

Defense Committee, had proven incapable of providing a coherent overview of British foreign
policy in the whole. 23 Consequently, as Cabinet Secretary Norman Brook complained to
Eden shortly before Macmillan took office, past attempts to reach "agreement on long-term
[foreign and defense] policy . . . merely resulted in short-term compromises . . . [and]
wasteful expenditure. "24 A long-time critic of the inefficiencies in the defense apparatus,
Macmillan desired a forum which would allow mandarins to transcend narrow departmental
views and provide a more objective assessment of Britain's position in the world and its
foreign policy prospects. The result was a series of reviews which marked a departure from
the norm not only with regard to the scope of their inquiry, but also in terms of their
organization. 25
The first secret review of Britain's global role was commissioned by Macmillan in
November 1957, with the strong support of Cabinet Secretary Brook. The Cabinet committee
assembled for this ambitious project was chaired by Brook and consisted of the Permanent
Secretaries of the overseas departments--the Foreign Office, the Commonwealth Relations
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Office, the Colonial Office, and the Minister of Defense, along with, of course, the Treasury.
Each of these departments drew up position papers on Britain's world role to provide the
initial basis of discussion. 26 After reviewing these papers, the senior officials involved were
given the mandate to challenge all aspects of British foreign policy, and it seems they took
up the task with zeal.
Interestingly, given the gamut of the inquiry, the greatest controversy arose over the
east of Suez role. In early sessions, a number of officials questioned whether Britain derived
any positive benefits from its overseas military positions. One participant asked, "Would,
for example, our influence in the world be better assured by building up. our economic
strength rather than maintaining a world-wide military presence?" 27 Another reminded his
colleagues that "the present strong economic'position of Germany and America in the course
of the 19th century were not built upon world power. "28 British officials thus seemed to
recognize that the basis of international influence was beginning to change in the midtwentieth century. Military might alone was not sufficient; a thriving economy was also
necessary both to support a military presence abroad and to ensure that a country's influence
would be felt in the decades ahead. It seems clear from the discussions in early meetings that
an embryonic consensus was forming among these powerful mandarins for withdrawal from
the military network east of the Suez. Ideas of disengagement were carried so far that the
delicate question of timing was even considered, as withdrawal had to be done in a way that
would minimize the inevitable damage to Britain's prestige. 29
Yet, before the committee completed its work, opinion, however gradual in some
quarters, swung back to favor maintaining the overseas military role. The outcome was a
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final report entitled "The Position of the United Kingdom in World Affairs" which vigorously
defended the country's military presence east of the Suez. But in its tone and its language,
the report also confirmed the fact that a heated debate over Britain's overseas military role
had taken place. It stated that given the country's long history of world power and its farflung trading interests, it was now impossible for Britain to retreat into the "neutrality and
comparative isolation of purely commercial powers such as Sweden and Switzerland. "30
Such a retreat from overseas military burdens was precisely what had been advocated by a
sizable minority on the committee. The report went on to further confute such isolationist
tendencies, arguing that despite the country's balance of payments problems, it was in the
nation's interest to increase spending on Britain's overseas military positions.

Since the

defense budget had assumably been slashed to the bone -with the Sandys Doctrine, the report
concluded that if any economies were to be found, they would have to be in domestic
expenditure.
In essence, members of the secret review were grappling with a fundamental dilemma
in any powerful state's grand strategy, the balance between economic solvency and disposable
military might. 31 Only· months before this review, Frederick Bishop, Macmillan's Principal
Private Secretary, pithily summarized the quandary which British policymakers faced:

If we disregard the economic effects, we could take every possible defence
assurance. Then we might be safe from the military threat, but we would
succumb economically. At the other extreme, we could take the risk of dispensing
with virtually all of our defences, which would be economically safe, but
militarily suicidal. No one can say at what point either of these extremes would
become a certain danger. 32
Poised on the horn of this dilemma, the mandarins m the first secret review raised
fundamental questions akin to those put forward by Bishop, but they did not go so far as to
12

advocate the removal of one of the fundamental military pillars of Britain's world role: the
east of Suez network. Perhaps because the lenses in which they viewed the world were still
colored by the long-standing paradigm of world role, they ultimately opted for the status quo.
However, their conclusions ran counter to- the prescriptions of Whitehall's senior
department, and consequently led to considerable friction over the issue in the government.
The standard Treasury line throughout the 1950s was the need to cut, or at least hold
constant, overseas expenditure in order to achieve a positive balance of payments. Not doing
so, in the Treasury's view, would weaken foreign confidence in sterling and increase pressure
on the reserves, with the ultimate result being the erosion of Britain's status in the world. 33
In two inner Cabinet meetings on the secret review's report, in June and July 1958,
Chancellor Heathcoat Amory argued forcefully against its conclusions. 34 He insisted that
there was no room for further domestic cuts, a view which resonated with a number of senior
ministers, including the Prime Minister. It was Macmillan, after all, who just two years
earlier as Chancellor bluntly told the Prime Minister that it was not domestic spending, but
"defence expenditure which has broken our backs. "35 Having reached an impasse in the
military might vs. economic soundness debate, an even more ambitious review of Britain's
role in the world and its future policy options was authorized. As before, the project was
shrouded in secrecy, but its parameters were much broader.
Commissioned in June 1959, the "Study of Future Policy" was essentially a
continuation of the review process began in 1957. There were two stages in this review
process. 36

The first consisted of a working group overseen by Sir Patrick Dean, the

chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which included the Deputy Under Secretaries
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from the foreign policy departments as well as the Treasury and the Ministry of Fuel and
Power (which was included to help determine how vital Middle Eastern oil was for the British
economy).

Several ·subcommittees were set up under this working group to report on

functional problems, like nuclear proliferation and regional issues.

Again, Macmillan

instructed that these committees be as objective as possible and, subsequently, discussions in
the working groups tended to be relatively unhindered by departmental biases. 37 However,
the relevant Permanent Secretaries and the Chiefs of Staff were less than enamored with this
departure from normal procedure, and they were therefore organized into a steering
committee which was interposed between the working group and ministers.

Chaired by

Norman Brook, the steering committee represented the second stage of the review process,
which was to produce the final report for the Cabinet.
The purpose of this elaborate committee machinery was to ascertain potential global
transformations over the coming decade and their probable impact on Britain's international
position. Using their interpretation of such changes, the committee would then be able to
make recommendations on the country's foreign policy path through the 1960s.

It was

originally hoped that such policy recommendations would be ready for whichever party won
the 1959 general election, but the review process took longer than expected, with discussions
continuing well into 1960. 38
The first task of the working group was to ascertain where Britain would stand in the
world over the coming decade.

This aspect of the review is important because it

demonstrates not only that British policymakers were concerned about the country's
international status, but that they had a lucid understanding of the extent of Britain's decline
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in the late 1950s. For example, the working group concluded that economically "even if the
United Kingdom's economy expands at the rate required to double national income in 25
years (2.8% [annual GDP]), we shall be left far behind, and our relative position vis-a-vis
both the U.S.A. and Western Europe will have declined. "39 In terms of military might, it
was argued that "only the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. ... have the strength to provide and
sustain a complete global ·power apparatus. The United Kingdom, with its ageing population
and dwindling possessions overseas, cannot even approach this status. "40 The measures used
to produce these estimates were uncomplicated. Gross steel production and electrical output
were used to provide a general measure of economic strength, while GNP per capita,
population growth, and the proportion of national income channeled into defense were
analyzed for military strength. Overall, it was accepted that Britain's "relative power and
status in the world [would] probably decline" throughout the 1960s. 41
Using these estimates of Britain's weakening international position, the working group
split into two polar factions over the policy course Britain- should take in the future. One
faction supported the maintenance of an active world-wide military role based on the AngloAmerican alliance. The other argued that Britain's overseas military positions had become
superfluous in the post-World War II era, particularly when Britain was dwarfed by the
superpowers in terms of economic and military capability. This latter group also suggested
that Britain's ties with the U.S. might actually be strengthened if Britain withdrew into a
regional role within Europe, since America had long supported closer European political
cooperation. 42 All of the fundamental issues concerning Britain's overseas military role
were discussed in detail, and were often the source of considerable contention. Arguments
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about Britain's commitment to contain communism, the true worth of the Commonwealth,
and the country's obligation to assist in the development of former colonies swirled round and
round in the working group.
The great difficulty members of the group had in attempting to appraise and prioritize
long-standing planks of British foreign policy was underscored by its chairman, Sir Patrick
Dean, in a note to the Treasury in August 1959. Of the three "circles" which had been a
persistent theme of British foreign policy since 1945--the Commonwealth, the Atlantic
Alliance, and Europe--Dean discusses the latter two:
The present position is that we have achieved very close association with the
U.S.A. and it seems to me that in spite of temporary setbacks, sometimes very
serious ones like Suez, the association steadily becomes closer. Logically, as our
relative power in the world declines and the advantages which we presently enjoy
as the centre of the Commonwealth become less obvious and perhaps disappear,
the Americans may feel less attraction for us and tend to put their weight, money,
and influence behind a united Europe or some other grouping. But logic is not
decisive so long as we can maintain our reputation for good sense, produce really
first-class brains and ideas, particularly in the scientific and technical field, I
think the Americans will tend to look more to us and not less. Again, logically,
this might lead to our passing from a position of interdependence with theU.S.A.
to a dependent, and it is certainly for consideration whether this is the fate which
is best for this country. In such a case it might well be better to merge ourselves
more into the continental European group and to assert our influence as part of
that grouping, maintaining as far as possible, a special association with the
Americans. I do not think, however, that one can be sure . . . 43
As can be seen, the process of attempting to determine how Britain's shrinking resources
could best be utilized to maintain the country's international influence was, at least for many
of the individuals involved, an arduous one.
At the end of the day, though, if Michael' Carver, who observed the workirig group
for the War Office, is to be believed, the two most powerful departments in Britain's foreign
policy establishment, the · Foreign Office and the Treasury, argued forcefully for
16

disengagement from the overseas military role. 44 Representatives from the Colonial Office
were split on this issue, while the other members present favored the status quo.

Not

surprisingly given this breakdown, those advocating a dramatic restructuring of Britain's
overseas role carried the day during the initial stages of the review process. A number of
stark proposals for withdrawal from the east of Suez area were included in the working
group's conclusions. But perhaps because the Chiefs of Staff were also included in the
steering committee, the final report was considerably watered down. 45
Similar to the first secret review's gradual change in tone, the steering committee's
conclusions were nearly the reverse of what might have been expected given the discussions
in earlier meetings. Consistent with military thinking of the time, the final "Future Policy"
report stated that war in Europe had become improbable and that subsequently Britain should
focus on winning small-scale conflicts in the Middle East and Far East.

While it was

admitted that swelling nationalism was beginning to turn some of Britain's overseas facilities
. into liabilities, the steering group asserted that this did not mean that Britain's overseas
commitments should be reined in. Instead, the report suggested that Britain should produce
an even more mobile force structure than that proposed by the Sandys Doctrine. To support
overseas commitments and to bring this more mobile force structure into being, the report
concluded that defense spending should remain at roughly the same level, around 7-8 % of
GNP.46.
Despite the painstaking work which had, gone into the "Future Poli~y" review, it never
actually served as any form of blueprint for Britain's foreign policy. The Cabinet considered
the conclusions of the review at a single weekend meeting at Chequers, with the fate of the
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report being sealed when the Prime Minister was unable to attend at the last moment. In his
absence, it is unlikely that ministers read the report seriously and, as a consequence, the
meeting was much less productive than had been anticipated. 47 No policy decisions were
taken on the country's overseas role at this meeting, and as is the case for all non-decisions,
this was in effect a vote of confidence for the extant policy course.
Thus, any hope of a substantial redirection of policy, already limited given the diluted
nature of the "Future Policy" review's,final report, gradually slipped away in an atmosphere
of political indifference. In this regard, it is important to note that by the time the second
secret review was completed in 1960, the political environment in Britain had been
transformed. The acute sense of decline which was so prevalent at the time of the Suez crisis
seemed to have drifted away, and for good reason. 48 Britain's international prestige had by
this time largely recovered from the blow dealt by Suez.

Perhaps more important, the

country's economy after 1958 was buoyant, so much so that The Economist even proclaimed
in January 1960 that the country's slow postwar "recovery was turning into a boom. "49 The
economic upswing and the renewed sense of confidence helped to sweep the Conservatives
back into office in 1959 with a convincing victory at the polls. Although this feeling of
economic well-being and security would be relatively short-lived, it nevertheless helps to
explain why Britain's overseas military role remained largely intact in the years immediately
following the Suez debacle.
Serious questions about the utility of military positions overseas and Britain's proper
role in the world were thus raised in the secret reviews, but they were soon engulfed in the
tranquil politics of affluence and consensus which characterized the Macmillan regime at the
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peak of its power, in 1959-1960. All things considered, it should not be-surprising that the
more radical propositions in the secret reviews, such as complete disengagement from the
overseas military role, never influenced policy. Political thought on all points of the political
spectrum, including that of Labour Party intellectuals such as Anthony Crosland and John
Strachey, tended to accept the political and economic assumptions behind Britain's world role
in the late 1950s. 50 William Wallace summarizes well the mood pervading Britain at this
time:

". . . in the wake of the Suez campaign and in the long-awaited flush of post-war

prosperity, ... the vast majority [of Britons], politicians and public alike, ... demanded a
reassertion of Britain's traditional position. "51 Britain of the late 1950s was enjoying what
might be termed an Indian Summer of world power. With what seemed on the surface to be
excellent economic prospects· and the continued appearance of greatness, there seemed to be
no reason to scrutinize the country's changing position in the world. 52 The national crisis
of confidence brought on by the Suez venture faded in the resurgent atmosphere of the late
1950s. Or, perhaps it is more accurate to state that the crisis was postponed.
Nor was Whitehall immune to this renascent mood. The opposition to the east of Suez
role expressed in the secret reviews was not at all common in the foreign policy bureaucracy
at this time. There is little evidence, for instance, to suggest that either the Foreign Office
or the Treasury ever consistently opposed the overseas military role in normal
interdepartmental intercourse.

Representatives from these departments who argued for a

withdrawal from the east of Suez role during the secret reviews were either advancing a
single strain of opinion within their respective ministries or.they took Macmillan's directive
to transcend departmental views to heart.
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For example, in outlining Britain's essential interests east of the Suez for the Prime
Minister's Commonwealth Tour in early 1958, the Foreign Office concluded that "in the
Persian Gulf our position has withstood with welcome resilience the shock of the Suez crisis"
· and consequently "there is no reason to believe that the essentials of our position [in this area]
will become less tenable or valuable in the future. "53

Although the events of 1956

undermined the British position in the "Northern Tier" states of the Baghdad Pact, the
Foreign Office continued to claim that Britain's interests in the Middle East were essentially
the same as they had been since the Second World War: "to maintain the free flow of oil and
freedom of communications and to oppose the spread of communism in the area. "54 A
continued presence in South Asia and the Far East was advocated by the Foreign Office at
this time as well, although it was recognized that America's role, and in many areas its
predominance, would continue to grow in both of these areas. 55
In the Treasury, lower-level officials were beginning to question the burden that
overseas military spending placed on the British economy in the late 1950s. But the senior
department has never been in the habit of making specific policy recommendations, and
lower-level dissent over defense costs was consistently smothered by senior· department
officials at this time. 56 In fact, at one point during the "Future Policy" "review, the Treasury
even accepted that the economy might benefit from increased military spending overseas if
foreign aid and other incidentals were simultaneously cut. 57
In addition, one is hard pressed to find opposition to _the east of Suez role from other
'· ~

,'

•

departments in the foreign policy bureaucracy during this period.

l

'

At this time, it was

generally accepted that the overseas military network was in the interest of foreign policy
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departments. Commonwealth and colonial ties were reinforced by a British military presence
in the Indian Ocean area and the armed services were bestowed with the budgets and the
array of weaponry necessary to support a global military role. In sum, it seems that outside
of the unique forum of the secret reviews, opposition to the east of Suez network was rare
in Whitehall.
Thus, Britain's overseas military presence weathered the shock of the Suez crisis and
the questions about Britain's role in the world which necessarily followed. The paradigm of
world role, centered in part on the east of Suez military network, somehow persisted, even
though by this time the formerly great chain of bases was thinning out. In part because of
a surge in anti-British sentiment after the Suez invasion, the British military was forced to
leave the Trincomalee naval'base in Ceylon in 1957, Jordan in 1957, and two air bases in
Iraq in 1958. 58 In 1960 Britain also decided to abandon a newly-built base in Kenya which
had _cost nearly L7.5 million. 59

Whether it was related to the Suez episode or not, a

sweeping transfer of power in Africa was initiated in the late' 1950s and early 1960s, of which
the withdrawal from Kenya was merely a small part. By 1960 it had become evident that the
last bastion of British colonialism would soon disappear. 60 With it an important argument
for the continuation of the east of Suez role, which was particularly potent in the early postWorld War II period, evaporated. If it could logically be said that the east of Suez role
provided for imperial defense in the late 1940s, which may have been a somewhat dubious
proposition after Indian independence, it certainly was no longer the case in the late 1950s
'

~~

"

and early 1960s.
But the winding down of Britain's colonial empire and the gradual winnowing of the
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country's military network overseas did not cause leaders to suspect that the network itself
was becoming untenable. Instead, the Macmillan government concluded that the foundations
of Britain's greatness, including the east of Suez network, were too sturdy to be seriously
disturbed by the Suez debacle. The British ship of state would thus sail on in the late 1950s,
and the politics of consensus continued to reign supreme. As we have seen, however, this
steady course was not achieved without serious questions being raised by some of the
country's most able lieutenants.

Conclusions

It is widely accepted that dramatic redirections of policy tend to only occur in the
wake of significant political shocks such as crises or wars. 61 By demonstrating that the
current policy course is seriously flawed, such shocks shake the very foundations of a policy
paradigm. But the window of opportunity for dramatic policy change opened by a crisis is
inevitably short-lived, as the fluid period when fundamental policy assumptions and
institutions are called into question eventually steadies. The politics of normalcy then return,
with incremental policy change, rather than bold policy innovation, again becoming the ·
rule. 62 Once the political environment stabilizes, the parameters of policy set by a policy
paradigm again become the underlying, unquestioned bedrock of policy.
As is uniformly recognized, the Suez debacle was a tremendous blow to Britain's great
power aspirations in the post-World War II period. But its effects are only thought to have
'·
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been gradual. Vernon Bogdanor and Robert Skidelsky summarize this widely held view well,
stating that,

"In the late 1950s the politics of consensus reigned supreme . . . [which
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subsequently] . . . imposed a moratorium on the raising of new and vital·issues. "63 It is
commonly thought that it was only in the mid-1960s, when Britain's economic situation began
to deteriorate more rapidly, that the lessons of Suez were finally grasped by British
policymakers and the public alike.
This study demonstrates, however, that the impact of the Suez crisis was more
immediate.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, new and vital issues were raised about

Britain's world role in a series of thorough, critical reviews commissioned in the aftermath
of the crisis. These reviews called into question the foundation stone of British foreign policy
following the Second World War, the policy paradigm centering on the country's world role.
Although the policy window opened by the Suez debacle was eventually closed in the
resurgent political atmosphere of late 1950s Britain, it is nevertheless important that emphasis
be placed on this scarcely-documented episode. Not only do the secret reviews of Britain's
world role in the late 1950s represent the first cracks in what had by that time become the
hallowed policy paradigm of Britain's world role. The doubts that were raised about Britain's
overseas military network in Whitehall in the late 1950s also surely lingered into the next
decade. Reinforced by events in the 1960s, it is plausible, and indeed probable, that they
slowly grew into a potent force supporting British ·policymakers' eventual decision to
withdraw from the east of Suez network.
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